אירועים והרצאות בפקולטה למדעי המחשב ע"ש הנרי ומרילין טאוב

Computer systems are everywhere, often controlling critical processes and containing sensitive secret information. However, the ubiquitous nature of computer systems also means that such systems often operate in hostile environments where they are subjected to various attacks by adversarial parties. Even if the system's security is theoretically proven under some set of assumptions, when faced with real-word attack scenarios, many theoretical assumptions become flaky, inaccurate and often completely incorrect.

In this talk I will present two cases for this gap between security theory and security practice:

* Utilizing unintentional and abstraction-defying side-channel leakage from physical computing devices in order to extract secret cryptographic keys and the relation of these attacks to leakage resilient cryptography.
* Constructing and deploying secure computation schemes for arbitrary C programs.

The talk will discuss cryptographic techniques and will include live demonstrations.