|Time+Place:||Wednesday 27/08/2014 14:30 Room 601 Taub Bld.|
|Title:||Strict Action Uncertainty|
|Speaker:|| Reshef Meir - CSpecial Lecture - Note unusual day and place
|| Affiliation: || Harvard School of Engineering and Applied Sciences
|| Host: || Shaul Markovitch
I will introduce a natural and general model of uncertainty for games with many players. Intuitively, the states of the world are all action profiles of the agents. Each agent considers as "possible" (without assigning probabilities) all profiles that are close to the actual state according to some natural metric. Several classical approaches to decision making under strict uncertainty are applied, such as weak dominance and regret minimization. I will focus on two applications of the model: to the analysis of Plurality voting (joint work with Omer Lev and Jeff Rosenschein), and for congestion games under uncertainty (joint work with David Parkes). I show that the behavior of rational players under uncertainty in both settings follows a simple heuristics, and always converges to a pure equilibrium. Further, equilibria often reproduce patterns observed in the real world, and moderate uncertainty improves the welfare of the society.