Abstract:

There are many different notions of information-theoretic entropy and its
computational analogues. The right notion and a toolbox of lemmas can make
for beautifully simple proofs.  Drawing on examples from
information-theoretic key agreement, leakage-resilient cryptography, and
deterministic encryption (no background in these topics is assumed), I will
show how various extensions of entropy can lead to improved cryptographic
constructions.

 
Short Bio:
 
Leo Reyzin is an Associate Professor of Computer Science at Boston 
University, conducting research on extending cryptographic techniques to 
provide protection in more hostile environments.  He received his A.B. 
in computer science from Harvard, and S.M. and Ph.D. in cryptography at 
MIT.  He is a recipient of the National Science Foundation's CAREER 
award and of Boston University's Neu Family Award for Excellence in 
Teaching.

Refreshments served from 14:15 on,
 	Lecture starts at 14:30