Abstract:

Can we design algorithms when the participating parties are self 
interested?  The goal of the field of Algorithmic Mechanism Design 
is to answer this and similar questions. In this talk I will demonstrate 
the fundamental challenges, notions, and techniques of the field.
Examples include:

-- The clash between incentives and computation.
-- The algorithmic framework of maximal-in-range algorithms.
-- Bounding the power computationally efficient truthful algorithms.
-- Characterizing truthfulness: beyond VCG mechanisms.
-- The power of randomization.

All issues will be illustrated via the lenses of the simple problem of
multi-unit auctions.

Short Bio
Shahar Dobzinski is a post-doctoral researcher at the computer science
department at Cornell University. He received his PhD from the Hebrew
University in 2009. His main research area is the border of computer
science, game theory, and economics, and in particular algorithmic 
mechanism design. His work received several awards, including the 
Hebrew University's Schlomiuk prize for outstanding PhD thesis, and 
an outstanding paper award in EC'09.