Omer Tamuz (Weizmann Institute)
Wednesday, 9.11.2011, 12:30
We will discuss some models of interacting economic agents on social
networks. The first part of the talk will include a short introduction
to the topic, including:
- Why assume agents are rational? What does it mean to be rational?
- When is it computationally feasible to be rational?
- When does interaction eventually lead to agreement, and when can
disagreement persist indefinitely?
- When does interaction lead to efficient aggregation of information,
and when is information lost?
In the second part of the talk we will describe recent results showing
that the phenomena of agreement and efficiency are related in a wide
spectrum of models. In particular, under different conditions, we will
show that agents that reach consensus are bound to learn from each
other in the process.
Joint work with Elchanan Mossel and Allan Sly